Moorean Absurdity and Expressing Belief by WILLIAMS, John N.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School of Social Sciences School of Social Sciences
9-2003
Moorean Absurdity and Expressing Belief
John N. WILLIAMS
Singapore Management University, johnwilliams@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Social Sciences at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School of Social Sciences by an authorized administrator of Institutional
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
WILLIAMS, John N., "Moorean Absurdity and Expressing Belief " (2003). Research Collection School of Social Sciences. Paper 19.
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/19
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/19
 
 
ANY OPINIONS EXPRESSED ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHOR(S) AND NOT NECESSARILY THOSE OF 
THE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS & SOCIAL SCIENCES, SMU 
SMU  HUMANITIES  &  SOCIAL  SCIENCES  
WORKING  PAPER  SERIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moorean Absurdity and Expressing Belief 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
John Williams 
 
September 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paper No. 4-2003 
Moorean Absurdity and Expressing Belief 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 
G. E. Moore famously observed that to for me to assert, ‘I went to the pictures last 
Tuesday but I don’t believe that I did’ would be ‘absurd’ (1942: 543). Over half a century 
later, the explanation of the nature of this absurdity remains problematic. Such assertions 
are unlike semantically odd Liar-type assertions such as ‘What I’m now saying is not 
true’ since my Moorean assertion might be true: you may consistently imagine a situation 
in which I went to the pictures last Tuesday but fail to believe that I did.  Moreover, if 
you contradict my assertion then your words, ‘If he went to the pictures last Tuesday then 
he believes he did’ do not report a necessary truth .1   Nonetheless it remains absurd of me 
to assert that p and I don’t believe that p.  It seems no less absurd of me to silently judge 
that p and I don’t believe that p2.  But why should it be absurd of me to assert something 
that might be true of me?  Why should it be absurd of me to believe something that might 
be true of me? 
In §II I argue that any satisfactory account of Moorean absurdity should 
acknowledge an important connection between the answers to these two questions. I call 
this connection, ’Shoemaker’s constraint’. One way to see the connection is in terms of 
the ‘expression’ of belief.  But this is not the only way of seeing it. In fact the notion of 
expression, in particular the expression of one’s beliefs, is tricky to elucidate. I then 
account for the absurdity of Moorean belief in §III.  In §IV I give an explanation of the 
absurdity of Moorean assertion that avoids the messy notion of expressing belief.  I 
defend this account in §V against two objections and show that it satisfies Shoemaker’s 
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constraint with great economy. Nonetheless my account allows for the possibility of 
providing the connection in terms of expressing belief.  I provide this in §VI, in which I 
also defend the provision against several claims made by David Rosenthal. 
 
II.  Three constraints on solution. 
 
There is a recent tradition3 of attempting to deliver the explanation of the absurdity of 
Moorean assertion in terms of Moorean belief4.  For example, Sidney Shoemaker (1995, 
note 1, p.227), observes that, ‘What can be coherently believed constrains what can be 
coherently asserted but not conversely’5.  But since ‘coherently’ is ambiguous between 
‘consistently’, ‘appropriately’ and ‘rationally’ then Shoemaker’s constraint had better 
stick with Moore’s own term ‘absurdly’, by which he means ‘irrationally, either in theory 
or practice’.  This yields: 
If I cannot non-absurdly believe that p then I cannot non-absurdly assert that p  
 
The failure of the converse of this is supported by at least one successful prediction, since 
it correctly excludes my utterance  
 I’m asserting nothing now  
from the extension of Moore’s example6.  After all, I could quietly believe in or 
acknowledge my continuing obedience to a Trappist vow of silence in a perfectly 
sensible way. 
 However we might also want to explain why circumstances in which I make 
Moorean assertions are connected to those in which my beliefs in my words are also 
Moorean. There is a long tradition of adding this final explanation by an extra principle 
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that  
 In some sense of ‘express’, my assertions express my beliefs7.   
However, this observation is seldom elucidated.  Moreover, ‘express’ is largely a term of 
art. Is the verb to be used factively, like ‘know’ or ‘recognise’?  Is it to be used as 
containing an intention, like ‘shoot’ or ‘warn’?  Used factively, ‘I expressed a belief I 
didn’t hold’ would be a self-contradiction in the same way as ‘I expressed milk from my 
empty breast’8. On the other hand there seems to be a non-factive sense of ‘express’.  For 
example in response to your offer to show me your holiday snapshots for the umpteenth 
time, there is a sense in which I may express an interest I don’t have. Used as containing 
intentions, “I expressed my belief that Bush is mad by muttering ‘Bush is mad’ in my 
sleep” would be a self-contradiction in the same way as ‘I warned him, while asleep, that 
the snows are treacherous this year’.  Since this already gives us four possible senses of 
‘express a belief’ it would be sensible to identify which one is intended9   
 As Thomas Baldwin (1990, p.228) points out, your knowledge that I’m telling 
you a lie when I make the Moorean assertion to you will not expunge my absurdity. 
Indeed as Rosenthal notes (1995a, p.203), nor will any other context of communication.
Just as your knowledge that I am lying to you when I make a Moorean assertion does 
nothing to expunge the absurdity, so your knowledge that I’m reminding you, 
misinforming you, confessing to you or announcing to you, does nothing to expunge it 
either. So insincere Moorean assertions, notably Moorean lies, will have to be located 
within the messy business of expression.  One natural way to describe a liar is as 
someone who expresses a belief he doesn’t hold, so the two factive senses of ‘express’ 
appear to prevent liars from making assertions. But this would mean that liars couldn’t 
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tell even a lie.  Some commentators respond by heroically denying that lies are genuine 
assertions but are rather bits of play-acting (Rosenthal 1995a, footnote 15, p.208).  But 
then it would follow that I could refute the accusation that I have told you a lie by merely 
admitting that I was lying, for then I could not have told you anything.   Austin (1970, 
pp.69-71) is similarly heroic in holding that if I insincerely say ‘I promise,’ I don’t 
strictly speaking promise, but only say I do.  If this were true then it would make a 
mockery of justice. For then I could conveniently escape from a contractual ‘promise’ by 
just admitting my insincerity.  
 This difficulty should make us consider whether we may sidestep the notion of 
expression entirely.   One strategy for sidestepping the notion of expression of belief is to 
first explain the absurdity of Moorean belief and then give a speech-act account of the 
absurdity of Moorean assertion in terms of the assertor’s necessarily frustrated intentions. 
 Besides Shoemaker’s constraint on the explanation of Moorean assertion or 
belief, there is a second constraint as well.  An important fact still often overlooked in the 
debate is that Moore also observes that to say, ‘I believe that he has gone out, but he has 
not’ would be likewise ‘absurd’ (1944, p.204).  Unlike his first example, which has the 
omissive form p & I don’t believe that p, this has the comissive10 form, p & I believe that 
not-p11.  This semantic difference is inherited from the genuine difference between 
atheists and agnostics. The result is the difference between the specific commission of a 
mistake in belief and the specific omission of knowledge, given the now uncontroversial 
assumption of the doxacity of knowledge,  
 I can know only what I believe to be true.  
So the explanation of Moorean absurdity had better explain both forms, both in assertion 
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and in belief12.   
 Thirdly, there is a class of propositions that intuitively share the paradigmatic 
absurdity of Moore’s examples.  These include the non-conjunctive, I have no correct 
beliefs now, the non-first person, Although you think all my opinions mistaken, you are 
always right and God knows that I am not a theist13.  If these propositions really do share 
the essential features of Moore’s two examples, then any account of Moorean absurdity 
should generalise to assertions and beliefs of them as well.  
 
III. The absurdity of Moorean belief 
 
All commentators who explain the absurdity of Moorean belief appeal to the principle that 
belief distributes over conjunction:   
If I believe that (p & q) then I believe that p and I believe that q.  
Moreover it is hard to see how the absurdity of Moorean belief could be explained 
without it.  Although an appeal to doxastic principles in explaining the absurdity of 
Moorean belief should be generally regarded with suspicion, this principle is an exception.  
For unlike BB-type principles, it seems to follow from the very concept of belief. If I fail 
to believe that today is hot or fail to believe that today is humid, surely I cannot hold the 
belief that today is hot and humid.  Since the principle is a definitional truth, appealing to 
it prejudges no question of rationality.    
Now consider Moore’s omissive example.  If I believe that (p & I don’t believe 
that p), then since belief distributes over conjunction, I believe that p.  But then what I 
believe is false, since its second conjunct is false. Although my belief is not a belief in a 
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necessary falsehood it is self-falsifying. Although what I believe might be might be true 
of me and although I might believe it, it cannot be true of me if I believe it.  In other 
words, it is logically impossible for me to correctly believe it.  By contrast I can correctly 
believe Moore’s comissive example.  For if I believe that (p & I believe that not-p) then 
since belief distributes over conjunction, again I believe that p, which is consistent with 
the second conjunct of what I believe, but only if I hold contradictory beliefs about 
whether p.   
Moreover, discerning this fact, as we just saw, requires a minimum of reflection14. 
So it is not difficult to see I am guilty of a severe failure of theoretical rationality, and 
thus why my belief is absurd.   
In believing Moore’s omissive proposition I have a self-falsifying belief. In 
believing Moore’s comissive proposition, I escape this irrationality only by the 
irrationality of holding contradictory beliefs. Thus both beliefs are equally absurd 
because these two failures of theoretical rationality are equally severe.  For both types of 
belief are equally useless as guides to the truth. Any evidence that (absurdly) justifies me 
in believing the omissive proposition would justify me in believing what is then false. 
Likewise any evidence for my belief that p is ipso facto evidence against my belief that 
not-p and conversely.  Nonetheless the two irrationalities are distinct, as we should 
expect from the clear difference between an instance of ignorance and an instance of 
mistaken belief.   
The absurdity of other Moorean beliefs can be explained in the same way.  With 
one exception, all these beliefs are self-falsifying. For example, if I now believe that I 
have no correct beliefs now then my belief is correct only if it is incorrect.  Since my 
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belief is non-conjunctive, no appeal is needed to the principle that belief distributes over 
conjunction. Likewise, suppose that I believe that although you think all my opinions 
mistaken, you are always right.  If my belief is correct then you would be right to now think 
that it is mistaken, so it is incorrect.  Finally, suppose that I believe that God knows that I 
am not a theist.  To explain the absurdity of my belief we must acknowledge the facticity 
of knowledge: 
If I know that p then p    
If my belief is correct then since God’s knowledge is factive, I do not believe that God 
exists.  But in believing that God knows that I am not a theist, I believe that God exists.  
So my belief cannot be correct.   
To see the comissive exception, suppose that I believe that God knows that I am 
an atheist.  If my belief is correct then since God’s knowledge is factive, I believe that 
God does not exist.  But in believing that God knows that I am an atheist, I believe that 
God exists.  So my belief escapes self-falsification only if I hold contradictory beliefs 
about whether God exists.  Since I am in position to work this out with a little reflection 
(as we just did) I would be theoretically irrational in continuing to hold such beliefs. 
Now we know the exact way in which it is irrational to believe Moore’s 
examples, we may say that  
 MP) Any proposition is Moorean just in case it is a possible truth that self-
reports no irrationality but a belief in it is self-falsifying on pain of 
contradictory beliefs. 
 
One virtue of this definition is that it allows that there is nothing absurd in my believing 
or asserting 
 At least one of my present beliefs is mistaken 
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The reason why this proposition fails to be Moorean is that it fails to self-report a specific 
instance of mistaken belief, even under the assumption that I assert or believe it.  
Asserting or believing it would be a perfectly reasonable disclaimer of my infallibility 
that is has most probably been long true of me. Thus no deep contradiction-like flaw in 
me is revealed.  
 Of course, my belief in my own disclaimer guarantees that I have at least one 
false belief. For by reductio, if my belief that I have at least one mistaken belief is 
mistaken then none of my beliefs are mistaken, including my belief in this disclaimer. On 
the one hand this means I have inconsistent beliefs, namely a set of beliefs that cannot all 
be true. But on the other hand, it also means that my belief in my own mistakenness is 
infallible. Since I was most likely mistaken in some of my beliefs anyway, such a tight 
grasp of the truth that I am indeed mistaken represents a useful heuristic for finding out 
the truth about which specific mistaken beliefs I hold by looking again at the quality of 
evidence.  
  The lesson to be drawn from this is that Moorean absurdity is not to be analysed 
in terms of inconsistent beliefs but rather in terms of contradictory beliefs15. For self-
contradictory or contradictory beliefs are inconsistent but not conversely.  Inconsistency 
in my beliefs does not necessarily undermine my justification in the way my self-
contradictory or contradictory beliefs do. Any evidence for my belief that p is ipso facto 
evidence against my belief that not-p and conversely.  Thus any evidence for the truth of 
my self-contradictory belief that (p & not-p) is evidence for its falsehood.  By contrast, 
evidence for my belief in my occasional mistakenness need not count against any of my 
other beliefs, nor visa versa. I would now have inconsistent beliefs, but not contradictory 
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ones. My correct belief in my occasional mistakenness does not entail beliefs that 
contradict each other, since we may consistently suppose that I don’t believe that all of 
my beliefs are true. So unlike a Moorean belief, that is self-falsifying on pain of 
contradictory beliefs, my belief that some of my beliefs are mistaken is not Moorean, for 
by contrast, such commitment to the necessity of at least one false belief is benign16.    
 Since the mere truth of a Moorean proposition does not constitute any theoretical 
irrationality on my part,  
It is raining but I believe that it is raining without the least justification  
 
is also excluded from the extension of Moore’s examples (compare Alder 1999 pp.267-
268). 
 
IV. The absurdity of Moorean assertion 
 
 
Whenever I make an assertion to you I try to make you to believe me, or in other words, 
make you believe that I am sincerely telling you the truth. When my assertion is Moorean 
I am in a position to see that this attempt must fail.  So whereas the absurdity of Moorean 
belief is an irrationality of theorising, that of Moorean assertion is an irrationality of 
practice, in the sense that I am guilty of planning to achieve something I should see can’t 
succeed. 
  Assertions come under a great variety of descriptions. I may tell, remind, inform 
or misinform you that p. I may let you know or tell you the lie that p. I may point out, 
confess, or announce to you that p.  
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We may divide the class of assertions in three ways.  The first is in terms of their 
facticity. My assertion to you that p is factive only if p and is anti-factive only if not-p.  
So when I let you know that p, inform you that p, confess to you that p or remind you that 
p then I make factive assertions. When I misinform you that p or tell you the lie that p 
then I make anti-factive assertions.  Other descriptions of my assertions are neutral in 
terms of facticity, as when I announce to you that p or tell you that p.  The second type of 
description is in terms of the sincerity of my assertions, in other words, in terms of 
whether I believe what I assert. So when I let you know that p, in other words, inform 
you that p, I make a sincere assertion because I impart my knowledge that p to you and so 
(given the doxacity of knowledge) I believe that p. I am likewise sincere whenever I point 
out to you that p, confess to you that p or remind you that p.  But when I tell you the lie 
that p I make an insincere assertion.  Other descriptions of my assertions are neutral in 
terms of sincerity, as when I tell you that p or announce to you that p.   The third way to 
categorise my assertions is in terms of my intentions, in other words, the point of my 
assertion.  For example, when I let you know that p, I fulfil my main intention of 
imparting my knowledge to you.  But when I tell you the lie that p I attempt to make you 
mistakenly believe that p.  
This last difference shows that it would be a mistake to explain the absurdity of 
my Moorean assertions in terms of my intention to impart my knowledge to you.  Of 
course I cannot succeed in this intention when my assertion is Moorean.  One reason for 
this is that, as we just saw above, I cannot rationally believe what I assert.  So you are in 
a position to see that I cannot be sincere in my assertion if I’m rational.  This in turn will 
undermine my attempt to make you believe my words as part of my plan to get you to 
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know that they are true.  Since I’m also in a position to work this out (as we just did), I 
should see that my plan to impart knowledge to you must fail.  Moreover, as the hearer of 
my assertion you are often in no position to know the correct description of my assertion 
that p, in which case the most charitable way in which you can take it is as my attempt to 
let you know that p, which as we just saw, is bound to fail when my assertion is Moorean. 
Nonetheless an account of the absurdity of Moorean assertions in terms of such an 
attempt is too narrow to cover other cases of Moorean assertion, such as lying, in which 
my intentions are quite different (see xxxx).   This is especially so when you are in a 
position to know the correct alternative description of my assertion. 
Despite this difficulty we can nonetheless identify a set of my intentions that, with 
a few harmless exceptions, I have in common whenever I make any assertion.  Before 
identify these it is best to avoid confusion by first distinguishing between successfully 
making an assertion and making a successful assertion.  I fail to make a bona fide 
assertion if I utter, ‘The pubs are still open’ but am too drunk to articulate these words 
intelligibly.  Nor do I succeed in making a bona fide assertion if I utter these words as an 
actor in a play, since all I attempt is to depict the assertion of a fictional guise.   
Having successfully made a bona fide assertion, that assertion may succeed or fail 
depending upon its point, in other words what change of mind I intend to bring about in 
you.  In attempting to inform or let you know that p, I intend to get you to know that p.  
When I lie to you that p, I intend to get you to mistakenly believe that p.  In any such case 
I intend to get you to believe my words.  But I cannot succeed in this attempt unless I also 
get you to think that I am sincere in making the assertion. For if you think that I’m play-
acting or recognise that I’m lying then you have no reason to accept my words, so my 
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attempt to impart knowledge or lie to you will fail.  Since I should see with minimal 
reflection that this is so, my full intention must be to get you to believe my words by 
getting you to think me sincere in uttering them. It follows that I must intend to get you to 
believe that I am sincerely telling the truth.  In other words, I aim to make you believe 
me.   
Although our intuitions about what counts as believing me are not robust, there is 
reason to think that taking it to be a matter of believing that I am a sincere truth-teller is 
not just a convenient stipulation.  For if you don’t believe what I say then clearly you 
won’t believe me.  Nor will you believe me, as opposed to merely believing my words, if 
you accept my words but know that I am merely parroting information or inadvertently 
telling the truth in an attempt to deceive you that has failed because I have got my facts 
wrong.  A virtue of this account is that it recognises that lies are bona fide or genuine 
assertions despite the fact that liars are not genuine or sincere.  A seminar that succeeds 
in teaching people to be more assertive need not make them more sincere. Nor need it 
make them tell the truth more often.  So although liars only pretend to believe what they 
assert, they really do make assertions.  
When I make a Moorean assertion to you, no absurdity arises if you merely 
believe that my words are true.  For you can quite sensibly believe that I am ignorant in a 
specific way or that I hold a mistaken belief.  But with two harmless exceptions, my full 
intention in making an assertion to you is not simply to get you to believe my words.  
Rather it is to get you to believe my words by getting you to think me sincere in uttering 
them.  In other words, I always intend you to believe me (in other words to think me a 
sincere truth-teller) whenever I make any type of assertion to you.  This is certainly the 
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case when I let you know that p or tell you the lie that p.  So it is likewise the case when I 
misinform you that p, since misinforming is either lying or a failed attempt to inform.  It 
is also the case when I point out to you that p, since pointing out is pointed informing.  It 
is further the case when I confess to you that p since confessing is a type of informing (as 
opposed to falsely confessing).  Finally, it is also the case when I remind you that p. 
When I remind you that p I let you know the point of what you already know.  For 
example, knowing that you know you have an examination early the next morning, I 
might remind you of this as you order yet another beer towards midnight.  I could hardly 
hope to make you accept my reminder if you fail to think me a sincere truth teller.     
  When my assertion is Moorean my intention to be thus believed is necessarily 
frustrated.  It seems uncontroversial that assertion distributes over conjunction: 
  If I assert that (p and q) then I assert that p and I assert that q 
 Surely if I have told you that today is hot and humid then I have told you that today is 
hot and told you that today is humid. So if I tell you that (p and I don’t believe that p) 
then I tell you that p.  So in virtue of believing me sincere, you must think that I believe 
that p.  But given the same principle, I also tell you that I don’t believe that p.  So in 
virtue of believing that I tell the truth, you must think that I don’t believe that p.  So you 
must have contradictory beliefs if you believe me.   
  In the comissive case, if I tell you that (p and I don’t believe that p) then by the 
principle that assertion distributes over conjunction, I tell you that p.  So in virtue of 
believing me sincere, you must again think that I believe that p.  But given the same 
principle, I also tell you that I believe that not-p.  So in virtue of believing that I tell the 
truth, you must think that I believe that not-p.  So this time you must think that I have 
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contradictory beliefs.   
  So you cannot believe me in either case without thinking me theoretically 
irrational or being so yourself.  Since I should assume that we would both charitably 
avoid ascriptions of such irrationality if possible, I am in position to see with minimal 
reflection in either case that my plan to be believed is bound to fail.      
  Depending on how the type of assertion is described, there may be other oddities 
in it as well.  For example, when the assertion is a case of letting you know or informing 
you that p, I must already know that p.  This is impossible if I assert a Moorean 
proposition.  I cannot know a Moorean proposition, despite the fact that it might be true. 
As with belief, it seems unobjectionable that knowledge distributes over conjunction: 
If I know that (p & q) then I know that p and I know that q 
So if I know that (p & I don’t believe that p) then I know that I don’t believe that p, in 
which case the facticity of knowledge ensures that I don’t believe that p.  But the 
doxacity of knowledge shows this is impossible, since I also know that p. The 
impossibility of my knowing Moore’s comissive example can be likewise demonstrated 
if we grant that knowledge excludes belief in falsehood: 
If I know that p then I don’t believe that not-p.  
For if I know that (p & I believe that not-p) then I know that I believe that not-p, in which 
case the facticity of knowledge ensures that I believe that not-p, which contradicts the 
new principle. But having granted the doxacity of knowledge we must grant this new 
principle as well. Otherwise we would allow the possibility that I know that p while 
holding contradictory beliefs about whether p. Since this makes my belief that p irrational 
or non-truth-tracking, it could constitute part of my knowledge that p.  An alternative 
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route to the unknowability of a Moorean proposition is simply the fact that Moorean 
beliefs are irrational, as we saw in §III. 
 
V.  Neutralising two objections 
 
I now anticipate two objections to this account. The first is that there appear to be two 
funny cases of assertion that do not fit the central account just given.  For if I make either 
type of assertion to you, I do not aim to make you think I am sincerely telling the truth.  
The first case is when I say something to you merely in order to ‘wind you up’. For 
example, suppose that I know that you think highly of Bush’s intelligence, an opinion I in 
fact share.  Nonetheless I insincerely state that Bush is a moron in order to ‘rattle your 
cage’.  Here my intention is not to get you to believe my words by accepting my sincerity 
but rather to ensure you remain verbally opposed to my words by accepting my sincerity.  
The second case is when I make a ‘Tom Sawyer’ assertion to you.  For example, on 
learning that you have just discovered that I am a habitual liar, I decide to tell the truth 
for once.  So when you ask me if the pubs are still open, I tell you the truth that they are 
still open in order to deceive you into mistakenly thinking that they are not.   
  Unlike normal assertions, I aim in both cases to make you think that my words are 
false.  It should be noted that there is no absurdity on your part in fulfilling this aim when 
my assertion is Moorean.  In the omissive case, parsing your ‘Either it is not raining or he 
believes that it is raining’ as ‘If it is raining then he believes that it is raining’ would only 
amount to your report of my enjoyment of a very local form of omniscience about my 
beliefs about the weather right now.  In the comissive case, parsing your ‘Either it is not 
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raining or he doesn’t believe that it is not raining’ as ‘If he believes that it is not raining 
then it is not raining’ would only amount to your report of my enjoyment of a very local 
form of infallibility about my beliefs about the weather right now.  In neither case would 
it amount to epistemic praise or blame.  
But one response to the ‘winding up’ assertion is that since my main intention is 
to remain divided in verbal controversy with you, then it is not a bone fide assertion at 
all.  For if we say that whenever I make an assertion to you then I aim to change your 
mind, then my provocative utterances fail to count as assertion since I do not aim to 
change your mind at all.  Suppose that I keep on repeating the utterance whatever your 
response.  Then such utterances cease to be bona fide assertions but become as 
communicative as repeatedly jabbing you with a pin.  
Even if this response is misguided, a second reason why this case is harmless is 
that I can hardly hope to prolong verbal disagreement with you unless you think 
(mistakenly) that I’m sincere.  But I am in position to see that you couldn’t take me to 
hold a Moorean belief unless you thought I was irrational.   
The Tom Sawyer case is even stranger.  A closer look at the example shows why 
this is so.  When I when I tell you the truth for once that the pubs are still open, I do so 
because I know that the pubs are still open.  So the full description of my Tom Sawyer 
assertion is that I when I thus assert to you that p I intend in my knowledge that p, to get 
you to mistakenly believe that not-p by mistakenly believing that I’m insincere.  But as 
we saw above, when my assertion is Moorean I cannot know what I assert to you.  
Another related reason why the case is harmless is the fact that I intend to get you to 
mistakenly believe that not-p.  For such an intention on my part means that I myself 
 16
believe that p.  But when the assertion is Moorean, I cannot rationally believe what I 
assert.  A final reason why the Tom Sawyer case need not trouble us is that in such a 
case, my attempt to make you think me insincere is parasitic upon my expectation that 
you will normally think me sincere.  After all, a Tom Sawyer assertion is a double bluff.  
So the full description of such an assertion includes the fact that when I thus assert to you 
that p I intend to get you to mistakenly believe that I’m insincere because I know that in 
the normal case I will get you to think I’m sincere.  For example, when I tell you the truth 
this once that the pubs are still open, I can hope to make you think I’m insincere only 
because in the normal case, I can make you think I’m sincere in telling you this.  But 
when my assertion is Moorean, this is bound to fail, because there is no normal case in 
which I can sensibly try to make you think I hold a Moorean belief.   
The second objection I anticipate is that I am not necessarily guilty of practical 
irrationality in making an assertion when I know that I will not be believed. For I 
might feel sure, under your interrogation, that you think me guilty, and yet protest, ‘I’m 
damn well innocent I tell you’ in the knowledge that you won’t change your mind.   
But my assertion may have different points and may be directed at different 
audiences.  This disarms the objection.  Suppose that after an hour of protesting, I realise 
that you will never accept my innocence.  Surely it would be pointless to persist in 
attempting to make you accept my innocence by accepting my sincerity because I would 
be trying to do something I know will fail.  Instead I might sensibly repeat the protest but 
with the different intention of merely making you think I’m sincere.  If I know I really am 
guilty I might be feigning sincerity to get away with a lighter sentence, so that you say 
afterwards, ‘He's still guilty all right, but the poor chap really believes he didn't assault 
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that publican. He must have been really drunk’.  But if I now realise that you will punish 
me for my guilt regardless of any misguided sincerity on my part or see that you will 
never revise your verdict that I'm telling a lie then there is again no point in my 
assertions.  The sensible thing to do is to save my breath.   
Now suppose that I continue to protest my innocence for the sake of a camera that 
I know is recording the interrogation. My assertion now has the different point of 
convincing relevant persons who might watch the tape of my innocence, or failing that, at 
least of my sincerity.  If I now learn that all who will watch the tape are just as stony as 
you then surely the assertion would have no rational point, since we have now effectively 
removed any potentially responsive audience from the picture. Unless I now I stick my 
head out of the cell window and shout ‘I'm innocent!’ in the hope of imparting this 
information to any stray passer-by, continuing to proclaim my innocence would be like 
talking aloud to myself.  Doing this as an assertion would require an irrationally divided 
self in which one self reminds or convinces the other self of the first self's innocence.  On 
the other hand my point in repeating to myself, ‘I'm innocent’ might be not to make an 
assertion at all, but merely to keep my spirits up or to exercise my lungs. In such a case 
my utterances are more like an inspirational song than bona fide assertions. 
This analysis of the absurdity of Moorean assertion in terms of the speaker’s 
unbelievability can be extended to all other Moorean assertions.  For example, if you 
believe me when I assert that I now have no beliefs, then you must believe that I now 
have no beliefs (in virtue of believing that I tell the truth) and also believe that I now have 
a belief in what I assert (in virtue of believing me sincere).  Since I should see that you 
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would avoid the irrationality of forming contradictory beliefs, I should see that the point 
of my assertion is bound to fail. 
A virtue of my account of Moorean absurdity so far is that it sidesteps the messy 
business of ‘expression of belief’ It is maximally economical in requiring only the 
principle that belief distributes over conjunction in explaining the absurdity of Moorean 
belief and the parallel principle that assertion distributes over conjunction in explaining 
the absurdity of Moorean assertion.  Nonetheless the two accounts fit together in two 
ways that satisfy Shoemaker’s constraint.   
Firstly, what you must believe if you are to believe me when I make a Moorean 
assertion is identical to what is the case if I correctly believe my own words.  Secondly, 
since part of my aim in making a Moorean assertion is to convince you of my sincerity, in 
making a Moorean assertion I aim to get you to attribute a Moorean belief to me.  Since I 
am in a position to see that this is a license to judge me theoretically irrational, one you 
will withhold rather than think I’m joking, I should realise on minimal reflection that the 
point of my assertion will not succeed. 
 
VI. Connecting Moorean belief with Moorean assertion by means of expression of belief 
 
Nonetheless my account does not rule out elucidating the connection between Moorean 
belief and Moorean assertion in terms of expressing belief. But as we noted in §2, this 
must accommodate lying or otherwise insincere Moorean assertions  
Let us elucidate ‘express’ as both factive and intentional. It is factive in the sense 
that I express N only if I have N, where N is a noun phrase such as ‘milk’, ‘belief’, 
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‘interest’ or ‘indifference’. So if I express a belief that p to you then I have the belief that 
p.  By contrast I ostensibly express N to you just in case I represent myself to you as 
expressing my N to you, as when insincerely tell you that I’d love to see your snapshots 
again. Let us also use ‘express’ as containing a relevant intention, according to which 
muttering ‘Bush is mad’ in my sleep does not express my belief that Bush is mad, but 
merely manifests that belief.  I manifest N just in case I behave in a way that affords you 
reason to think I have N.  By contrast, I express N just in case I behave in a way that 
offers you reason to think that I have N, in other words, intentionally affords you that 
reason.  Where N is a belief this gives us a definition of expression of belief: 
I express my belief that p to you just in case I believe that p and I intentionally 
behave in a way that offers you reason to think that I believe that p   
 
as well as a definition of ostensible expression of belief: 
I ostensibly express a belief that p to you just in case I intentionally behave in a 
way that offers you reason to think that I believe that p   
 
As we should expect, all expressions of beliefs are ostensible expressions of belief but 
not conversely. We may now give a definition of assertion in terms of expression of 
belief:  
I assert to you that p just in case I ostensibly express to you a belief that p with the 
intention of changing your mind in a relevant way.   
 
The reference to ostensible expression accommodates lies, which are surely genuine 
assertions.  In lying to you that the pubs are still open I offer you a reason to think that 
they are still open by ostensibly expressing my sincerity.  The change of mind I intend to 
bring about is to make you mistakenly believe that the pubs are still open.  Likewise in 
letting you know that it is raining I offer you reason to think that it is raining with the 
intention of imparting to you my knowledge that it is raining. I offer you this in the sense 
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that this time, my ostensible expression of belief is genuine.  The change is relevant in the 
sense that the proposition I assert forms the core of the description of that change. 
This account of assertion also has the advantage of accommodating non-verbal 
assertions.  Absent-mindedly carrying an umbrella only counts as a manifestation of my 
belief that it will rain since it affords you reason to think that hold that belief.  By 
contrast, shaking it defiantly in your face when you scoff at my forecast of rain counts as 
my assertion that it will rain, since I have deliberately offered you a reason to think that it 
will rain, namely that I think so myself, with the intention of changing your opinion about 
the weather.  This means that there can be non-verbal Moorean assertions as well, as 
when you ask me if the pubs are still open and I nod my head in emphatic agreement 
while saying, ‘I don’t believe so’.  Perhaps Moore has such a case in mind in explicitly 
distinguishing between the uttering of words assertively and making an assertion (see 
Baldwin 1993, p. 207).   
In what sense do I offer you reason to think that I believe that p in asserting to you 
that p?  A liar attempts to represent himself as a sincere truth-teller.  But if lying were 
known to be the universal norm then this attempt would always fail with the result that 
the practice of lying could never succeed.  A speech act not governed by the norm that 
the speaker believe its content to be true, would not be the speech act of assertion 
(compare Williamson 1996). Thus if you are to make sense of my speech acts then the 
rational thing for you to do is to assume that I am sincere unless observation suggests 
otherwise.  Thus my speech act of assertion that p gives you prima facie reason to think 
me sincere. What immediately follows from the account now is a principle of ostensible 
expression of belief: 
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If I assert that p to you then I ostensibly express my belief that p to you. 
 
However Rosenthal (1995a, p 203) rejects this approach based on the claim that a 
Moorean assertion is “absurd even in soliloquy, where no betrayal of insincerity is 
relevant; one cannot [coherently] say to oneself ‘It’s raining but I don’t think it is’”.   But 
this is a bad example, since soliloquy is apt to be absurd anyway.  Unless soliloquy is 
merely a stage performance, in which case it is just the pretence of assertion, isn’t talking 
to myself a sign of madness? For example if I tell myself that p as an attempt to let 
myself know that p, then the attempt is pointless since I already have the knowledge I’m 
trying to impart.  On my account we can explain the absurdity of omissive Moorean 
soliloquy as my attempt to make myself both believe that I believe that it’s raining (in 
virtue of making myself believe I’m insincere) and believe that I don’t believe that it’s 
raining (in virtue of making myself think I’m telling the truth).  The absurdity is now 
revealed as my attempt to make myself irrational.  On the other hand if my soliloquy is 
merely on stage then I have depicted this absurd attempt on the part of my fictional guise, 
although I have not made an assertion myself, absurd or otherwise. 
Having granted the sincerity of my assertion, you now have reason to grant its 
truth.  For granting that I’m sincere in what I tell you grants me the minimal authority I 
need for you to accept my testimony.  Admittedly, there are cases in which I make the 
honest mistake of sincerely telling a falsehood.  There are also cases in which I 
insincerely tell the truth by presenting my lucky guess as an assertion or by getting my 
facts backwards in an attempt to lie.  But given that you are not in a position to suspect 
that this is one of these rare cases, my assertion that p also gives you prima facie reason 
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to believe that p.  In short, my assertions give you prima facie reason to believe me. This 
account also vindicates a second principle of ostensible expression of lack of belief 17
If I assert that p to you then I ostensibly express my lack of belief that not-p to 
you. 
 
If you are to make sense of my speech acts then you must charitably assume that I do not 
hold contradictory beliefs about whether p.  So once you have granted the sincerity of my 
assertion that p you must also grant that don’t believe in the falsehood of my own words, 
in other words that I’m innocent of a stronger form of insincerity, namely lying. 
Some who write about expression (see Green, Chapter 2) might object that it is 
impossible to express a lack of anything, perhaps because of the facticity of expression.  
If I can only express what I really have, how can I express something that isn’t there?  
Surely a woman couldn’t express a lack of milk from her breast.  But we can see that the 
facticity of expression is compatible with the possibility of expressing a lack of N, once 
we notice that a lack of N, such as a lack of confidence, is something real that I can have 
within me.  If you ask me if I’m interested in going to a party and I shrug my shoulders, I 
may express indifference to your proposal.  My indifference is something real inside me, 
but an equivalent way of describing it is as my lack of interest both in going and in not 
going to the party.     
It now follows that that there is a more direct way for me to express my belief that 
p to you, namely by asserting to you that I believe that p.  For making this assertion gives 
you a prima facie reason to believe me and so gives you a prima facie reason to believe 
my words.  Thus a third principle drops out of the account, that my self-report of belief 
expresses that belief:  
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If I assert that I believe that p to you then I ostensibly express my belief that p to 
you. 
  
In accordance with the first principle, in making such an assertion I also ostensibly 
express my higher order belief that I believe that p as well.   
However Rosenthal (1995a, p.199, compare Hajeck and Stoljar 2001) denies this. 
He holds that by asserting that p I express the belief that p, but in reporting that I believe 
that p, I do not express this belief (2002, p. 168).  Rosenthal assumes that since my report 
of belief, ‘I believe that p’ expresses my higher order belief that I believe that p, then it 
cannot also express my belief that p as well.  For he also assumes that if it did, then there 
would be no difference between reporting a belief by ‘I believe that p’ and expressing a 
belief by ‘p’.  On my account both assumptions are false.  For my assertion ‘I believe that 
p’ both expresses my belief that I believe that p and also expresses my belief that p.  But 
this does not mean that there is no difference between reporting a belief by ‘I believe that 
p’ and expressing a belief by ‘p’.  The difference is that in making the plain assertion ‘p’ 
I do not express a belief that I believe that p.  
A fourth principle that my account yields is that self-report of lack of belief 
expresses my lack of belief: 
If I assert that I don’t believe that p to you then I ostensibly express my lack of 
belief that p to you. 
 
For making this assertion gives you prima facie reason to believe my words. This gives 
us a third connection between the absurdity of Moorean belief and that of Moorean 
assertion.  In the omissive case, when I assert to you that (p & I don’t believe that p) then 
I assert that p (since assertion distributes over conjunction) and so by Moore’s first 
principle, I ostensibly express a belief that p.  But I also self-report my lack of that belief 
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and so I ostensibly express that lack of belief that p.  So I ostensibly express a belief and 
the lack of it.  In the comissive case, when I assert to you that (p & I believe that not-p) 
then I assert that p (since assertion distributes over conjunction) and so by Moore’s first 
principle, I ostensibly express a belief that p.  But I also self-report that same belief. So I 
ostensibly express it.  Thus I ostensibly express contradictory beliefs.  In both cases, what 
I ostensibly express by making the assertion, namely a contradiction or a contradiction in 
my beliefs, is precisely what you must believe if you are to believe me when I make it to 
you. 
This account can be extended to the other Moorean propositions. For example, if I 
now assert to you that I have no beliefs now, I ostensibly express a belief (that I now 
have no beliefs) that contradicts the total lack of belief I ostensibly express in self-
reporting that total lack of belief.   
 Moreover it also accounts for the absurdity in non-assetoric contexts such as, 
‘What time is it?  But I don’t want to know what time it is’.  In asking a question under 
the right circumstances I offer you the prima facie reason to think that I want to know the 
answer.  Such circumstances exclude those in we both know that I am checking the 
accuracy of your watch. So I express a desire to know the time, the existence of which is 
contradicted by my second remark. Likewise in issuing a command I express the desire 
that it be executed by offering you the prima facie reason to think that I want it executed.  
Such circumstances exclude those in we both know that I am reluctantly passing on an 
order from above.  Thus in saying, ‘Shut the door!  But I want you leave it open’ I 
express a desire that you shut the door, the existence of which is contradicted by my 
second remark. 
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Notes 
1. In parsing your “Either it is not raining or he believes that it is raining” as “If it is 
raining then he believes that it is raining” I take ‘if’ as implication.  Although 
such an inference is generally invalid, most would allow it here.  For example, 
Stalnaker 1975 and 1984 would allow it on pragmatic grounds since here you 
don’t know which disjunct is true. 
2. Sorensen 1988 (Chapter 3, pp.16-56) is probably the first commentator to 
consider the nature of Moorean belief.  Until then only the absurdity of Moorean 
assertion was considered, initially as a pragmatic paradox in speech acts.  Since 
then xxxx , xxxx, xxxx, Baldwin 1990, Heal 1994, Rosenthal 1995a, 1995b and 
Shoemaker 1995 have discussed it. 
3. For a recent survey of the literature since Moore, see xxxxx. 
4. Sorensen (1988 p.39) first attempts this strategy by simply observing that a 
Moorean assertor appears to be a Moorean believer.  But this calls for an 
explanation of why appearing to hold such a belief makes me absurd. 
5. This constraint is anticipated in Wolgast (1977, p.118). 
6. Pace Rosenthal’s claim that ‘Moore’s paradox occurs with sentences… which are 
self-defeating in away that prevents one from making an assertion with them’. 
(2002, p.167). 
7. The expressivists include Wittgenstein (1980, §472), Wolgast (1977, p.119), Heal 
(1994, p.22), Hajek and Stoljar (2001), xxxx, xxxx and Rosenthal (1995a, p.197, 
p.199 and 1995b, pp.317-319).  
8. The Latin root of the verb ‘express’ is ‘press out’ 
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9. Rosenthal (1995a, p.198) uses ‘express’ in a way that ignores intentions, whereas 
most other commentators distinguish between expressing a belief and 
unintentionally manifesting or betraying it. Xxxx is one of the few that have used 
‘express’ non-factively. Another exception is Searle (1983, p.9) who observes that 
‘…in the performance of each illusionary act with a propositional content, we 
express a certain International state with that propositional content, and that 
Intentional state is the sincerity condition of that type of speech act’.  For Searle, 
one can express intentional states without being in them. 
10. Sorensen coins these useful terms in (1988, p.16). 
11. This formalism is disguised by Moore’s examples.  This is one reason to think 
that Moore himself did not see the difference between the omissive and comissive 
forms of his own examples. For further discussion see xxxx. 
12. This constraint on explanation is recognised by xxxx, De Almeida (2001, p.30) 
and Heal (1994, p.6).  Rosenthal’s diagnosis (2002, p.171) that a Moorean 
sentence denies the occurrence of the intentional state that it also purports to 
express, fails to explain the omissive assertion in which I deny nothing but rather 
affirm a belief.  By contrast Hájeck and Stoljar’s (2001, p.209) diagnosis of the 
absurdity of omissive Moorean assertion, that I express contradictory beliefs 
(because I assert that p and so express a belief that p and also assert that I believe 
that not-p and so express a belief that not-p) does not apply to the comissive 
assertion. 
13. See Sorensen 1988, Chapter 1 and xxxx. 
14. As De Almeida (2001,p.42) notes, I need the minimal intelligence to present 
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myself with such an argument for the absurdity. But this hardly constitutes an 
objection. 
15. The tripartite distinction between holding a self-contradictory belief, as when I 
believe that (p and not-p), holding a pair of contradictory beliefs, as when I 
believe that p and I believe that not-p and holding an inconsistent set of beliefs, as 
when I believe that p and believe that q and believe that not-(p and q) is the 
distinction between believing something that contradicts itself, holding a pair of 
beliefs that contradict each other and holding a set of beliefs that cannot all be 
true.  The distinction is underpinned by the fact that belief does not collect over 
conjunction.  Some commentators (for example De Almeida 2001) make the same 
distinction by describing beliefs as ‘contradictory’,  ‘strongly inconsistent’ and 
‘weakly inconsistent’. 
16. Against De Almeida’s objection (2001, pp.42-43). 
17. Once Moore’s own term ‘imply’ is read as ‘ostensibly express’, these two 
principles correspond to Moore’s first principle that if I assert that p I imply, “in 
an everyday sense of ‘imply’”, that I believe that p (1942. p. 542) and to his 
second principle (1944) that that if I assert that p then I imply that I don’t believe 
that not-p.  This is a better elucidation of ‘imply’ than his own statistical claim 
that ‘…in the immense majority of cases in which a person says a thing 
assertively, he does believe the proposition which his words express.’ (1993, p. 
210).  For in this sense, a 90% chance of snow tonight implies bad weather in the 
offing.  But suppose that in the immense majority of cases in which words pass 
through lips, the source of those words is an inhabitant of the planet Earth.  So the 
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passing of words through lips, for example, ‘The planet Earth is worth saving’ 
implies that their producer is an Earthling.   But although it would be surprising to 
hear someone add, ‘although I’m not an Earthling’ such an addition is not absurd 
in the way exemplified by Moore’s examples, because that addition betrays no 
irrationality.  
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